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Accurate detection of executive dysfunction in neuropsychological assessments is 
complicated by the fact that executive functioning (EF) is vulnerable to temporary 
disruption (i.e., lapses) across the lifespan, with more frequent lapses in older adulthood. 
Effortful regulation of affect (i.e., expressive suppression) is a well-known source of 
executive lapses in younger adults, but the generalizability of this depleting effect to 
older adults is unknown. The purpose of this study was to 1) determine whether EF is 
subject to depletion via expressive suppression and 2) to explore the possible relationship 
between depletion and global cognitive status in older adults. We compared the 
performance of 97 nondemented, community dwelling older adults on a battery of tests 
measuring EF and component processes both before and after exposure to emotionally-
evocative stimuli (in either the nonregulating control group or the expressive suppression 
group). Participants also completed a screening of global cognitive status at baseline. 
Consistent with the hypothesized depletion effect, suppressing participants showed an 
attenuated practice effect on postmanipulation EF relative to controls, while performance 
on component processes was unaffected by suppression. Level of improvement on 
executive measures was unrelated to global cognitive status in both groups. These results 
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Executive functioning (EF) is a broad construct encompassing higher order 
neurocognitive processes involved in planning, selection, and execution of activity that is 
purposeful, goal-directed, future-oriented, and socially informed (Suchy, 2016). Accurate 
identification of executive dysfunction in the course of a neuropsychological evaluation 
is important for two main reasons.  First, deficits in EF are characteristic of a range of 
clinical populations (for reviews, see Cummings & Miller, 2007; Suchy, 2009); thus, 
identification of EF deficits has diagnostic implications.  Second, EF is arguably the best 
predictor of independent functioning in daily life (Bell-McGinty, Podell, Franzen, Baird, 
& Williams, 2002; Chaytor & Schmitter-Edgecomb, 2003; Insel, Morrow, Brewer, & 
Figueredo, 2006; Kraybill, Thorgusen, & Suchy, 2013).  Thus, accurate assessment of EF 
helps clinicians make recommendations about patients’ ability to function independently.   
While accurate assessment of EF is important in all clinical situations, it is 
particularly relevant when assessing older adults. This is because executive weaknesses 
are present in the early stages of many neurodegenerative conditions that are common in 
old age, such as frontotemporal and vascular dementias (for reviews, see Engelborghs et 
al., 2005; Lezak, Howieson, Bigler, & Tranel, 2013). This issue is further compounded 
by the fact that EF declines somewhat with age, even among high functioning, healthy 
older adults (Baudouin, Vanneste, & Isingrini, 2004; Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004; Krampe, 
2002; Mitsis, 2004).  Thus, superimposing even a subtle, preclinical decline in EF due to 
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a neurodegenerative process over normal age-related cognitive changes can lead to an 
increased risk for functional lapses in daily life (Kraybill & Suchy, 2011; Mitchell & 
Miller, 2008; Razani et al., 2007; Royall, Palmer, Chiodo, & Polk, 2004, 2005). For 
example, previous research in our lab has shown that approximately 35% of 
nondemented, community dwelling older adults (with no more than mild executive 
weaknesses) make errors on tasks that mimic instrumental activities of daily living, 
suggesting that they are at risk for functional lapses at home (Suchy, Kraybill, & 
Franchow, 2011b).  Furthermore, subtle EF weaknesses predict decline on a behavioral 
measure of instrumental activities of daily living over the course of 1 year (Kraybill, 
Thorgusen, & Suchy, 2013). Thus, the clinical utility of neuropsychological assessments 
in older patients is clearly dependent in part on accurate estimation of EF. However, the 
ecological validity of many standardized measures of EF has been challenged (Burgess, 
Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998; Burgess et al., 2006). 
There are several contributing factors to the limited ecological validity of EF 
tests.  First, standardized executive tests are relatively unreliable from a psychometric 
standpoint (Ettenhofer, Hambrick, & Abeles, 2006). Second, neuropsychological 
assessments typically tap into a limited subset of cognitive skills subsumed under EF, and 
tools needed for comprehensive assessment of all aspects of EF are currently lacking (for 
a review, see Suchy, 2016). Third, EF tests have traditionally been validated based on the 
relationship between test performance and the presence of lesions in the neuroanatomical 
substrates associated with EF (typically, the frontal lobes; Stuss et al., 2002; Stuss, 2011), 
rather than behavioral outcomes in daily life.  
In addition to the typical culprits of poor ecological validity of executive tests, 
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there is an additional, less-commonly considered, contributor to poor ecological validity 
of EF assessments: the fluctuating nature of EF itself.  In particular, there is growing 
evidence that EF is particularly vulnerable to disruption in the form of temporary 
“lapses.” For example, among both younger and older adults, executive performance 
fluctuates somewhat in the course of daily life with transient mood states (Martin & 
Kerns, 2011; Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, & Williams, 1996), poor sleep quality and 
efficiency (Benitez & Gunstad, 2012; Sutter, Zollig, Allemand, & Martin, 2012), and 
both acute and chronic pain (Jongsma et al., 2011; Karp et al., 2006; Nes, Roach, & 
Segerstrom, 2009). Furthermore, older adults show greater intraindividual variability in 
executive performance compared with their younger counterparts (for a review, see West, 
2001; West, Murphy, Armilio, Craik, & Stuss, 2002), suggesting more frequent lapses in 
later life. 
One well-documented source of executive lapses in young adult samples is recent 
engagement in expressive suppression. Expressive suppression is an emotion regulation 
strategy involving effortful control of facial affect and other automatic behavioral 
expressions of emotion, such as laughter or crying (Gross, 1998). Though adaptive when 
used in moderation (Gross, 2007), expressive suppression is also associated with 
increased amygdalar and autonomic activity (Ohira et al., 2006), making it a highly 
effortful and physiologically expensive strategy. There is a large body of literature 
documenting an association between expressive suppression and performance decrements 
on subsequently administered executive tasks (a “depleting” effect on executive 
resources), including logic and reasoning, cognitive extrapolation, response inhibition, 
and working memory tests (for a review, see Baumeister & Alquist, 2009; Inzlicht & 
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Gutsell, 2007; Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003). Additionally, 
executive depletion appears more likely in the context of atypically-high state 
suppression (i.e., self-reported levels exceeding the sample mean in the previous 24 hours 
but lower levels than the sample mean over the previous 2 weeks) (Franchow & Suchy, 
2015). However, this research is entirely based on young adult samples. 
It is unknown whether expressive suppression continues to deplete EF in older 
adulthood.  There are several reasons to question whether findings with young adults can 
be generalized to older adults. First, presumably in part because they are more practiced, 
healthy older adults appear more successful in their emotion regulation efforts than their 
younger counterparts, with overall reduced negative affect and lower rates of depression 
(Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Charles, Reynolds, & Gatz, 2001). 
Thus, emotion regulation in general may be less executively demanding for older than for 
younger adults. The exception to this pattern is older adults who are beginning to exhibit 
both executive impairments and emotion dysregulation, such as in the early stages of 
dementia (Lindau et al., 2000; Suchy, 2011; Sultzer, Levin, Mahler, High, & Cummings, 
1993). Second, people in their 60s and older tend to report less frequent use of expressive 
suppression as a regulatory strategy as well as higher rates of proactive coping and 
positive reframing to avoid emotional upset (John & Gross, 2004; Lang, Staudinger, & 
Carstensen, 1998). Perhaps due to lower base rates of expressive suppression in later life, 
there is very limited research documenting the cognitive and behavioral effects of 
suppression in older samples.  
There is also very limited evidence regarding the specificity of the depletion effect 
to EF in younger adults, and the authors are unaware of any published studies addressing 
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this question in older adults.  EF encompasses higher order cognitive processes 
dependent on many lower order component processes (including perception, information 
processing speed, and basic attention) (Goldberg & Bilder, 1987; Stuss, Picton, & 
Alexander, 2001; Suchy, 2016). Therefore, it is possible that apparent depletion of EF is 
actually reflective of a deleterious impact on underlying component processes. While the 
past experimental research has not controlled for component processes when assessing 
EF, previous research in our lab supports the notion that abnormally high state 
suppression differentially depletes EF (i.e., not affecting processing speed or working 
memory after accounting for shared variance with EF) (Franchow & Suchy, 2015). This 
is important from an assessment standpoint considering the diagnostic utility of 
impairments in related, but dissociable cognitive domains (EF vs. component processes) 
in older adults (for a review, see Levy & Chelune, 2007; Schoenberg & Duff, 2011). 
 
Purpose of the Current Study 
 
The purposes of the current study were to (a) determine whether EF is 
differentially depleted by expressive suppression in older adulthood (relative to other 
related cognitive processes) and (b) explore the relationship between level of depletion 
and global cognitive status in community-dwelling older adults. To these ends, we 
administered a battery of cognitive tests to a sample of healthy, community-dwelling 
older adults, including a global cognitive screening measure as well as tests of EF and 
component cognitive processes. We then experimentally manipulated expressive 
suppression in order to induce executive depletion, and retested EF and component 
cognitive processes.  
Based on available evidence in young adult samples, we hypothesized that 
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experimentally manipulated expressive suppression would deplete executive resources, 
but not component processes in older adults. Considering that we would normally expect 
improved performance on repeat cognitive testing (i.e., a practice effect; Lezak et al., 
2013), depletion could be indicated either by poorer performance or simply an attenuated 
practice effect on postmanipulation testing. While there is growing evidence supporting 
diminished practice effects in the early stages of cognitive decline (Duff et al., 2011; 
Duff, Chelune, & Dennett, 2012), there is no existing literature examining the association 
between executive depletion and overall cognitive status. Therefore, our second aim was 
exploratory and we hope that the present study will serve as a springboard for future 
























 Participants were community-dwelling older adults recruited from a local senior 
health fair and via advertisements distributed to students enrolled in coursework designed 
for older learners from a local university. Interested individuals provided contact 
information in person and/or by email and completed screening for study eligibility by 
phone. Participants were screened for a self-reported history of dementia or mild 
cognitive impairment. In order to ensure valid interpretation of all cognitive test data, 
exclusion criteria also included uncorrected vision or hearing impairments, color-
blindness, left-handedness (due to evidence of abnormal lateralization of neurological 
function and potentially different cognitive profiles of left-handed individuals; Gunstad, 
Spitznagel, Luyster, Cohen, & Paul, 2007; Szaflarski et al., 2002), and motor dysfunction 
in the right hand/arm (precluding completion of speeded graphomotor tasks; see 
Measures). In an attempt to control for prior exposure to our measures (i.e., reduce 
practice effects on baseline testing), individuals who self-reported recent participation in 
cognitive testing (in other studies or as part of a clinical evaluation) were also excluded.  
The total recruited sample who completed all tasks (i.e., with complete data) 
included 107 older adults. Participants reporting potentially confounding conditions in a 
more comprehensive medical history questionnaire administered on the testing day were 
excluded from analyses; this included a history of occipital stroke (N=1), hereditary 
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motor neuropathy (N=1), essential tremor (N=1), and red/green color blindness (N=1). Of 
this sample, 6 additional participants were eliminated from analyses based on failure to 
follow instructions to suppress or react naturally per their assigned experimental 
condition (see Preliminary Analyses). The final sample used in principle analyses 
included 97 adults who were mostly female (69.1%) and mainly identified as Caucasian 
(94.8%). Their mean age was 68.74 years (SD= 5.54, Range= 60-86) and they had 
completed the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree on average (M= 15.98 years of education 
completed, SD= 2.45, Range= 11-21). Through periodic review of group characteristics 
as the study continued, pseudo-random assignment to either the Suppress (experimental) 
(n=48) or Free Expression (control) condition (n=49) was based in part on demographic 
characteristics in order to ensure similar age, educational achievement, and sex 
distribution (see Table 1). As can be seen in Table 1, the groups did not differ on 
demographic variables, recent depressive symptoms (GDS), baseline executive and 





 The study was approved by the appropriate university Institutional Review Board 
and all procedures were in compliance with APA ethical standards. Prior to their arrival 
for the testing session, participants were pseudo-randomly assigned to either the Suppress 
(experimental) or Free Expression (control) condition for the executive depletion task. 
Default group assignment was determined randomly (via an online random order 
generator), with later participants assigned to ensure group comparability (based on age, 
sex, and years of education). After undergoing informed consent procedures, participants 
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completed a 3.5- to 4-hour long neuropsychological testing battery one-on-one with an 
examiner in the Executive Laboratory in the Social and Behavioral Sciences building on 
the University of Utah campus. Baseline testing included measures designed to assess 
global cognitive status, EF, and component cognitive processes. Participants then 
underwent experimental manipulation as part of either the Expressive Suppression or 
Free Expression condition (see Measures). The same EF and component process 
measures from baseline testing were then repeated in postmanipulation testing in order to 
directly measure level of depletion in both domains as a result of engagement in 
expressive suppression. At the end of the visit, participants were given the option of 
receiving written and oral feedback regarding their performance on a global cognitive 
screening measure (either consistent with similar-aged peers, somewhat below 
expectations, or seriously below expectations) and questions/concerns were answered as 
appropriate. Participants were encouraged to consult with their primary care physician to 
obtain referrals for appropriate clinical follow-up and evaluation of any cognitive 





As an estimate of global cognitive status, participants completed the Dementia 
Rating Scale, 2nd edition (DRS-2) (Jurica, Leitten, & Mattis, 2001) as part of baseline 
testing. The DRS-2 is an extensively validated screening battery of tasks that assesses 
cognition in the domains of attention, initiation/perseveration, visuospatial construction, 
concept formation, and memory in a wide range of patient populations over age 60 
(Brown et al., 1999; Kovner et al., 1992; McDaniel & McLaughlin, 2000). A total score 
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across these domains reflects global cognitive ability, with lower scores indicating greater 
impairment suggestive of a cognitive disorder (Jurica et al., 2001). Previous research in 
our lab suggests that the total score provides a valid indicator of cognitive status that is 
also sufficiently sensitive to individual differences in a nonclinical sample (Suchy, 




The Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS) is a widely used screening measure for 
depression in older adults (Yesavage, 1988). The GDS was administered both to 
characterize the sample and to ensure that any observed group differences in response to 
the manipulation (including emotionally evocative material) were not the result of 
baseline differences in recent mood. Participants indicated the applicability of 30 
depressive symptoms to their feelings over the course of the previous week in a yes/no 




The Delis Kaplan Executive Function System battery (D-KEFS) is a well-
validated, widely used battery of EF (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001; Delis, Kramer, 
Kaplan, & Holdnack, 2004). We included four subtests reflecting widely recognized 
aspects of EF in both baseline and postmanipulation testing: (1) Trail Making Test, 
relying heavily on set-shifting and speeded sequencing; (2) Verbal Fluency, tapping 
verbal initiation and generative fluency; (3) Design Fluency, measuring nonverbal 
initiation and generative fluency; and (4) Color-Word Interference, reflecting response 
inhibition and attentional control. As in previous research in our lab (Franchow & Suchy, 
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2015; Kraybill & Suchy, 2011; Kraybill et al., 2013), scores from these subtests were 
combined into a single composite score.  
Specifically, the following age corrected scaled scores reflecting performance on 
the most executively dependent conditions from each subtest were combined into the 
baseline and postmanipulation composites: Trail Making Test: Letter Number 
Sequencing (Time to Complete), Verbal Fluency: Letter Fluency (Total Correct), Verbal 
Fluency: Category Switching (Total Correct), Design Fluency: Filled Dots (Total 
Correct), Design Fluency: Empty Dots (Total Correct), Design Fluency: Switching 
Conditions (Total Correct), Color-Word Interference: Inhibition (Time to Complete), and 
Color-Word Interference: Inhibition/Switching (Time to Complete). Importantly, a 
similar composite score based on DKEFS subtests was found to be sensitive to executive 
performance differences associated with self-reported recent engagement in expressive 
suppression in a sample of young adults (Franchow & Suchy, 2015). Both baseline and 
postmanipulation executive composite scores demonstrated acceptable internal 
consistency reliability in this sample (Baseline Cronbach’s α= .658; Postmanipulation 
Cronbach’s α= .736). 
 
Component Process Composite 
 
In addition to their well-known executive components, the Trail Making and 
Color-Word Interference subtests of the DKEFS also include conditions designed to 
measure simpler component processes that contribute to performance but do not rely on 
EF, such as letter and number sequencing, graphomotor speed, visual attention/scanning, 
and speeds of color naming and word reading.  This allows researchers and clinicians to 
better account for the effect of these processes on performance of the more 
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complex/executively dependent conditions. Specifically, the Trail Making Test includes 
conditions measuring speeded visual scanning and cancellation (Condition 1: Visual 
Scanning), simple line-tracing (Condition 5: Motor Speed), and sequencing without 
switching demands (Condition 2: Number Sequencing and Condition 3: Letter 
Sequencing). Similarly, the Color-Word Interference Test includes measures of speeded 
word reading (Condition 1) and color-naming (Condition 2) without an interference (i.e., 
executive) component. Completion times from each of these conditions were combined 
into baseline and postmanipulation component process composite scores. Both 
composites demonstrated acceptable internal consistency reliability in this sample 




Based on previously utilized methods (e.g. Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; 
Schmeichel et al., 2003), experimental manipulation of expressive suppression consisted 
of participants viewing affect-inducing video clips (without audio). Clips were edited into 
two separate videos with a combined 5-minute viewing time: Video A (2.5 minutes of 
disgusting content), and Video B (2.5 minutes of amusing content). All clips were 
gathered from material readily available on the internet, including some clips shown on 
popular television shows and news. Video A included disgust-inducing images; for 
example, people with various physical abnormalities and injuries or engaging in activities 
that viewers often find disgusting (such as eating nonfood items).  Disgusting images are 
commonly used in experimental manipulations of expressive suppression and associated 
with reliably high autonomic responses as well as subjective unpleasant emotional 
experience (Gross, 1998). Included in this compilation of disgust-inducing material was 
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one previously validated clip taken from the film Pink Flamingos (Gross & Levenson, 
1995).Video B consisted of amusing images, including people and animals in physically 
comedic situations. Amusing images were included in order to induce positively valenced 
responses with physiologic similarities to disgust (Hubert, Moller, & de Jong-Meyer, 
1993), as shown in similar prior research (Demaree, Schmeichel, Robinson, & Everhart, 
2004). Videos A and B were viewed in counterbalanced order across participants and 
groups in order to control for order effects. 
 All participants viewed both videos in one of two conditions: (1) Free Expression 
or (2) Expressive Suppression: 
1)  Free Expression: Participants were instructed to simply view the videos and react 
naturally (i.e., freely express their reactions via their facial expressions), as if they 
saw them while watching TV at home. This condition served as a comparison control 
for the Expressive Suppression condition. 
2) Expressive Suppression: Participants viewed the videos with instructions to not 
reveal (via their facial expression or any other observable signals) the reactions they 
may have had while watching. This condition required that participants engage in 
expressive suppression, which we hypothesized would include executive depletion. 
 All participants were observed from behind a one-way mirror (to minimize 
distraction) and rated on their level of observable reaction to each video on a Likert-type 
scale (1- No observable reaction to 5 – Constant reactions that were poorly controlled). 
Participants were also video-recorded while completing this task in order to: a) 
determine compliance with instructions by independent raters blinded to condition and b) 
to exclude any participants who appeared not to follow the condition instructions. To 
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ensure that the Expressive Suppression and Free Expression conditions were 
differentially effortful, a manipulation check was conducted immediately following the 
task in the form of a Likert-style item querying the level of effort exerted across both 
videos (“How difficult was the video-viewing task?” 1- Not at all difficult, 2- Somewhat 
difficult, 3- Fairly difficult, 4- Very difficult, 5- Extremely difficult). To further check 
compliance with task instructions, participants in both conditions also answered the 
following question in a free-response format: “What was your approach to completing 
this [video viewing] task? Please describe how you went about watching the videos in 
the space below.” The DKEFS subtests were then re-administered to participants in both 
conditions to determine the resulting level of executive and component-process depletion 


















Participant Demographics and Descriptive Data by Experimental Group 
 






Age 68.31 (5.21) 69.19 (5.87) .436 
% Female 65% 73% .511 
Years of 
Education 
15.88 (2.53) 16.09 (2.38) .666 
Depressive 
Symptoms 
4.98 (5.11) 5.46 (5.38) .654 
Executive 
Baseline 
11.87 (1.39) 12.03 (1.49) .569 
Component 
Process Baseline 
12.10 (1.11) 11.85 (1.25) .298 
Global Cognition 138.76 (3.66) 138.92 (3.18) .817 
Note. Depressive Symptoms= GDS total raw score (out of a possible 30); Executive         
Baseline = Premanipulation composite (DKEFS executive scores); Component Process 
Baseline= Premanipulation composite (DKEFS speed scores); Global Cognition= DRS-



















A postmanipulation questionnaire was administered in order to (1) eliminate any 
participants who reported regulatory strategies that were directly incompatible with task 
instructions and (2) to ensure that the two experimental conditions were differentially 
effortful among retained participants (see above). Based on their responses, 3 participants 
in the Free Expression condition who spontaneously suppressed (against instructions) 
were eliminated from further analyses. Similarly, 3 participants in the Expressive 
Suppression condition who reported a confounding lack of regulatory effort of any kind 
(No strategy) were eliminated from further analyses. As can be seen in Table 2, 
remaining participants in the experimental condition were significantly more likely to 
report some form of suppression (i.e., effort focused on regulating their facial expression) 
while participants in the control condition were significantly more likely to report either 
no strategy or to indicate that they responded naturally, per task instructions. The 
incidence of other spontaneous regulatory strategies was also similar across groups (see 
Table 2). Among retained participants, consistent with differences in observed affect, 
suppressors rated the video viewing task (across disgusting and amusing films) as 
significantly more difficult overall. This indicates that the suppression task was at least 
somewhat effortful, as designed, among participants attempting to regulate their affect.  
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Participant Reactivity by Experimental Condition, Stimulus Valence, 
and Order of Presentation 
 
In order to ensure that retained participants were exhibiting reactivity consistent 
with instructions in the two experimental conditions (to either suppress affective 
responses or freely express them), independent raters blinded to condition viewed their 
video-recorded responses to the experimental manipulation and coded each participant’s 
level of reactivity (e.g., detectable facial expression, body language, and/or verbalization) 
on a Likert-type scale (see above). Due to technical difficulties and/or examiner error 
during the sessions in question, recordings were unavailable for 4 participants (Free 
Expression N=1, Expressive Suppression N=3). Consistent with task instructions, 
recorded participants in the control group exhibited significantly higher reactivity to both 
the disgusting and amusing films compared with the experimental group (see Table 3). 
As can be seen in the table, reactivity to the two videos did not differ based on the order 
of their presentation in either the control or the experimental group. This suggests that the 
two films evoked comparably strong affective responses within groups. Furthermore, 
consistent with task instructions, participants in the Expressive Suppression condition 
were significantly less responsive to both types of stimuli when compared to controls. It 
can therefore be reasonably assumed that any postmanipulation differences in 









Zero-Order Correlations Between Cognitive Composites and Demographics 
 
Zero-order correlations among cognitive composite scores (pre- and 
postmanipulation EF and component processes) and basic demographics (age and 
education) in the full sample and in the two experimental groups are presented in Table 4. 
As can be seen, correlations among executive and component process performances were 
high across groups, as would be expected. As would be expected, age was unrelated to 
performance in either domain either before or after the experimental manipulation, as 
age-corrected scaled scores were used when creating composites. However, a distinct 
pattern between educational attainment and executive performance emerged at the group 
level: years of education was significantly related to postmanipulation executive 
performance in the control group only (r=.411, p<.01). This suggests that only those in 
the Free Expression condition benefited significantly from this form of cognitive reserve 




Expressive Suppression and Absolute Improvement on Executive Functioning 
and Component Processes Measures 
 
We first examined level of improvement in performance on executive and 
component process measures to determine whether suppression had a measurably 
depleting effect on executive practice. Specifically, we conducted a repeated measures 
analysis of variance with executive functioning and component-process composite scores 
as dependent variables, test time (pre- vs. postmanipulation) as the within-subjects factor, 
and experimental condition (free expression vs. suppress) as the between-subjects factor. 
Results indicated a main effect of time, with significant performance improvement across 
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domain and condition (F(1, 94)= 204.358, p<.001). An interaction between time and 
domain was also observed, such that the sample’s improvement on executive measures 
from baseline to retest was greater than their improvement on component process 
measures (F(1, 94)= 11.654, p<.001).  
As predicted, a significant interaction also emerged between cognitive domain, 
time, and condition; free expression participants showed a significantly-larger practice 
effect on executive measures (F(1, 94)= 12.603, p=.001). Specifically, control 
participants’ average executive score improved by 1.33 scaled score points (nearly 1/2 of 
a standard deviation) from pre- to postmanipulation testing. Participants in the 
suppression condition only improved by .8 scaled score points on average. In contrast, 
participants exhibited a similar improvement in component process scores across 
conditions; controls’ average component-process composite score improved by .65 scaled 
score points from pre- to postmanipulation testing and participants in the suppression 
condition improved by .83 scaled score points on average.  
 
Accounting for Expected Practice 
 
Considering that both groups improved from baseline to retest in both domains 
(i.e., practice effect), we examined whether attenuated executive improvement among 
suppressors remained significant after taking into account their expected retest 
performance. We used a regression-based method of computing reliable change in order 
to comprehensively address the influences of baseline test performance and demographic 
characteristics on participants’ retest scores (McSweeny, Naugle, Chelune, & Lüders, 
1993). Specifically, we modeled expected retest for the sample in each domain based on 
observed retest performances in the control group.  
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In separate linear regression models, postmanipulation executive and component 
process composite scores were the criterion variables, with corresponding baseline 
composite scores as predictors. Considering the known associations between 
demographic factors, cognitive performance, and practice effects (Heaton et al., 2001; 
Hultsch, MacDonald, Hunter, Levy-Bencheton, & Strauss, 2000; Mitrushina & Satz, 
1991), age, sex, and years of education were also included as predictors. We then 
calculated predicted composite retest scores for the sample based on the resulting 
regression formulas; the difference between participants’ actual postmanipulation 
performance and these predicted scores represented deviation from expected retest in 
each domain. A repeated measures analysis of variance model was then conducted with 
the scores reflecting deviation from expected retest performance used as the dependent 
variables: domain (EF vs. component-process) was the within-subjects factor and 
experimental condition (free expression vs. suppress) was the between-subjects factor.  
Results indicated a significant main effect of domain, such that the sample’s 
overall component process improvement was actually greater than their executive 
improvement after accounting for demographic predictors of expected retest 
performance. This was explained by a significant interaction between cognitive domain 
and condition (F(1, 94)= 14.698, p<.001) (see Figure 1). In order to examine simple 
effects, we conducted separate one-way analyses of variance with deviation from 
expected retest performance in 1) EF and 2) component processes as dependent variables 
and experimental condition as the independent variable. Results confirmed that 
suppressing participants fell significantly short of expected retest performance on 
executive measures only (F(1, 94)= 8.176, p=.005). As seen in Figure 2, control 
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participants’ average executive score improved by 1.33 scaled score points (nearly 1/2 of 
a standard deviation) from pre- to postmanipulation testing. In contrast, participants in the 
experimental condition only improved by .83 scaled score points on average. Participants 
across conditions deviated from expected retest performance on component process 
measures to a similar extent (F(1, 95)= 1.199, p=.276). Figure 3 illustrates the equivalent 
improvement in component process performance from baseline to retest; control 
participants’ average component-process composite score improved by .65 scaled score 
points from pre- to postmanipulation testing and participants in the suppression condition 
improved by .83 scaled score points on average. 
 
Executive Depletion and Global Cognition 
 
To explore possible relationships between global cognitive status and attenuated 
EF performance improvement (i.e., depletion) among participants in the experimental 
group, we examined zero-order correlations between global cognition and deviation from 
predicted retest scores in each group separately. Results are presented in Table 5. Among 
controls, deviation from predicted retest on executive measures was positively but 
nonsignificantly related to DRS-2 total raw scores (r= .259, p=.072), such that 
participants with better global cognition tended to exceed predicted retest performance. 
Deviation from expected executive retest performance in the experimental condition was 
more modestly (and also nonsignificantly) related to global cognitive status (r= .182, 
p=.220). This suggests a possible distinction between practice effects and the depletion 
phenomenon, such that true executive practice (unaffected by regulatory interference) is 
more closely related to global cognitive status. However, these relationships were 








Regulatory Strategies and Task Difficulty by Experimental Group 
 
 Free Expression      
(N= 49) 
Expressive 
Suppression (N= 48) 
Difference 
 Strategy Counts x2 value 
Total Strategies 59 62 -- 
Suppression 3 (removed) 30 -- 
Natural 
Responding 
7 0 7.39 ** 
Other Strategy 23 27 .842 
No Strategy 26 3 (removed) -- 
 Participant Counts             x2 value 
At least one 
strategy 
23 48 30.38 ** 
 Mean Ratings by Group t value 
Task Difficulty 1.63 (.87) 2.04 (1.11) -2.05 * 
Note. Free Expression=control group; Expressive Suppression=experimental group; 
Strategy counts represent the number of references to the strategy within each condition; 
Task Difficulty=1- Not at all difficult, 2- Somewhat difficult, 3- Fairly difficult, 4- Very 




















Across Order N=47 N=45  
Disgusting Film 3.57 (1.21) 1.73 (.85) 8.426 ** 
Amusing Film 3.44 (1.15) 1.71 (.99) 7.710 ** 
Disgusting First N=21 N=23  
Disgusting Film 3.66 (1.31) 1.56 (.72) 6.630 ** 
Amusing Film 3.61 (1.11) 1.69 (.97) 6.101 ** 
t value .465 -1.395 -- 
Amusing First N=26 N=22  
Disgusting Film 3.50 (1.14) 1.91 (.94) 5.254 ** 
Amusing Film 3.30 (1.19) 1.72 (1.03) 4.863 ** 
t value .915 -.106 -- 
Note. Free Expression=control group; Expressive Suppression=experimental group; 
Ratings of reactivity completed by independent raters blinded to condition on the 
following scale: 1- No observable reaction, 2- Minimal reaction, 3- Occasional 
reactions, 4- Frequent reactions (with some attempt to control), 5- Constant reactions 







Table 4  
Zero Order Correlations Between Cognitive Composites and Demographics 
 











.825 ** .488 ** .501 ** -.047 .247 * 
Executive Retest -- .580 ** .667 ** -.031 .321 ** 
Component 
Process Baseline  
-- -- .841 ** -.072 .059 
Component 
Process Retest  
-- -- -- -.081 .107 
Age -- -- -- -- .145 
Free Expression (N= 49) 
Executive 
Baseline  
.852 ** .362 * .417 ** -.133 .237 
Executive Retest -- .450 ** .595 ** -.038 .411 ** 
Component 
Process Baseline  
-- -- .841 ** .026 .064 
Component 
Process Retest  
-- -- -- -.004 .123 
Age -- -- -- -- .251 
Expressive Suppression (N= 48) 
Executive 
Baseline  
.829 ** .613 ** .573 ** .017 .255 
Executive Retest -- .670 ** .716 ** -.016 .260 
Component 
Process Baseline  
-- -- .846 ** -.136 .065 
Component 
Process Retest  
-- -- -- -.133 .098 
Age -- -- -- -- .039 
Note. Executive Baseline=Premanipulation DKEFS executive composite; Executive 
Retest=Postmanipulation DKEFS executive composite; Component Process 
Baseline=Premanipulation DKEFS speed composite; Component Process 




    Table 5  
Zero Order Correlations Between Deviation from Predicted Executive Practice, 
Executive Baseline, and Global Cognitive Status by Group 
 
Free Expression (N= 49) 







.259 .363 * .502 ** 
Executive Practice 
Deviation  
-- .000 .476 ** 
Executive 
Baseline  
-- -- .852 ** 
Expressive Suppression (N= 48) 
Global Cognitive 
Status  
.182 .490 ** .479 ** 
Executive Practice 
Deviation 
-- .132 .641 ** 
Executive 
Baseline  
-- -- .829 ** 
Note. Global Cognitive Status=DRS-2 Total raw score; Executive Practice 
Deviation=Difference between predicted executive practice and actual executive 
practice; Executive Baseline=Premanipulation composite (DKEFS executive scores); 
Executive Retest=Postmanipulation composite (same DKEFS scores); ** p<.01 (two-















Figure 1. The figure illustrates age-corrected scale score composite deviations from  
predicted practice effects by domain (executive functioning vs. component process) 
and condition (free expression vs. expressive suppression). Relative to their predicted 
practice effect based on controls (i.e., free expression condition), participants in the 
expressive suppression condition showed an attenuated postmanipulation practice 
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Figure 2. The figure illustrates average executive composite scores by time (baseline 








































Figure 3. The figure illustrates average component process composite scores by time 













































 The current study was designed to investigate a) whether EF is differentially 
depleted by expressive suppression in older adulthood (compared with nonexecutive 
cognitive processes) and b) to explore the relationship between depletion and global 
cognitive status.  To those ends, we recruited a sample of community-dwelling, 
nondemented older adults and compared their performance on a battery of subtests from 
the DKEFS measuring EF and component processes both before and after exposure to 
emotionally evocative stimuli in one of two conditions: free expression (control group) or 
expressive suppression (experimental group). We also obtained an estimate of global 
cognitive status at baseline (DRS-2).  
The key finding of this study is that EF in cognitively healthy older adults is 
susceptible to depletion via expressive suppression. Specifically, suppressors showed a 
significantly attenuated practice effect on postsuppression executive performance relative 
to a nonregulating control group.  This was significant even after accounting for expected 
retest performance in each domain based on demographic predictors. The second key 
finding is that depletion was specific to EF; in contrast to the significant deviation from 
predicted executive retest performance observed among suppressors, the two groups 
exhibited a similar level of improvement on component processes measures. Finally, 
attenuated executive retest performance (i.e., depletion) was unrelated to global cognitive 
status, while a trending relationship was observed between a pure practice effect (in the 
 
30 
control group) and DRS-2 performance. This suggests that individual differences in the 
degree of depletion are not related to global cognitive status in healthy elders. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine executive depletion in older adults. 
Furthermore, this effect was detectable on standardized tests used in neuropsychological 
assessments in research and clinical settings. 
 
Implications for Neuropsychological Assessment 
 
These results may have implications for cognitive assessment of older patients 
and participants. In particular, this experimental demonstration of depletion supports non-
psychometric sources of variability on executive tests in older adults; the executive 
system appears inherently variable in ways that bias performance on a given test day. For 
example, a person may arrive to a study or clinic appointment after an argument with a 
family member, navigating stress-inducing traffic, or in the midst of any number of other 
personal stressors. To the extent that these individuals attempt to hide their emotional 
upset, as would be socially appropriate, their test performance on a “bad day” might well 
be an under-estimate of their capacity. By the same token, testing on an unusually good 
day could over-estimate their capacity under more emotionally evocative conditions in 
day to day life. Both under- and over-estimation of EF have important implications for 
the validity and usefulness of their cognitive data. For example, a neuropsychologist 
might not detect cognitive problems in patients presenting on an especially good day, or 
consider them to be more functional than they actually are and fail to recommend 
appropriate safety precautions (such as a driving evaluation or assistance with 
medications). On the other hand, patients tested on a “bad day” might receive 
unnecessary diagnoses or restrictions on their independence. Furthermore, if a depletion 
31 
effect is detectable in a composite score based on four subtests (generally increasing the 
reliability of results), more erratic variability on single tests may be observed. 
 
Future Directions: Depletion as a Mechanism of Executive 
Lapses in Older Adults 
 
If executive performance varies as a function of dynamic demands on the 
regulatory system in older adults, then temporary depletion may in part account for 
executive lapses in daily life. For example, devotion of regulatory resources to affect 
control on a bad day might place older adults at elevated risk for functional problems via 
diminished executive resources. The potentially serious functional consequences of such 
lapses might include traffic accidents, medication mistakes, financial mismanagement, 
etc. Thus, capturing the frequency of suppression (or other depleting activities) in older 
adults might indicate their relative risk for executive lapses and their safety at home. 
Similarly, older adults who preferentially use suppression to regulate (though they are 
likely to be the minority; John & Gross, 2004) might be at elevated risk for dysexecutive 
behavior.  
The relevance of depletion as a mechanism of such lapses depends on how the 
effect operates outside of the laboratory. External validity depends, for example, on the 
length of depleted states; the more lasting the effect, the greater likelihood that it 
interferes significantly with older adults’ daily functioning. Previous research suggests 
that a depleted state may persist for some time after the initial regulatory demand, at least 
within the same 24-hour period (Franchow & Suchy, 2015). However, a more specific 
estimate in either younger or older adults is unavailable at this time. The functional 
impact of depletion may also depend on whether certain aspects of EF are more affected 
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than others. EF includes a number of more specific cognitive component processes, 
including goal-directed information retrieval, working memory, and mental 
flexibility/shifting (Suchy, 2016). Depletion may affect some of these processes more 
than others and the specific cognitive processes disrupted may also change over the 
lifespan. Future research is needed to examine these and other mechanistic questions 
about executive depletion in older adults.  
If in fact executive depletion in older adulthood is cognitively and/or functionally 
informative, a more practical method of capturing the effect in an assessment context will 
need to be determined. While an experimental manipulation designed to elicit depletion 
might capture the phenomenon most directly, researchers and clinicians may easily 
imagine logistical and ethical constraints on purposefully upsetting vulnerable 
populations for assessment purposes. Our previous research with younger adults captured 
depletion relevant for executive performance via self-report; specifically, participants 
reported the extent to which they had manipulated their emotional expression over the 
past two weeks as well as the past 24 hours on a Likert-type scale. A brief self-report of 
recent expressive suppression has the potential to be more practical in an assessment 
context while minimizing patient discomfort. However, such self-report only provides 
information about the regulatory burden on any given day, not the susceptibility to 
depletion for any given patient.  Future studies should examine the viability of self-
reporting expressive suppression in older adult samples.  
 
Depletion: Unrelated to Cognitive Status? 
 
Based on a lack of existing evidence, we made no prediction about the 
relationship between depletion and global cognitive status. Thus, the lack of relationship 
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in these data is potentially informative regarding the nature of depletion. First, it raises 
the possibility that depletion indicates a more subtle vulnerability in the executive system 
that is not captured by a broad cognitive screener; depletion might correspond with pre-
clinical executive weaknesses that are predictive of future decline, rather than current 
cognitive status. For example, previous research in our lab suggests that the deleterious 
impact of novel context on action planning latencies during a motor sequence learning 
task (termed the “novelty effect”) corresponds not with baseline cognitive performance, 
but with the extent of cognitive decline over the course of one year (Suchy et al., 2011a). 
In other words, one could conceptualize the novelty effect as a sign of diminished 
functional integrity of the executive system.  Similarly, greater depletion effect, at least 
theoretically, may be an indicator of diminished executive integrity, becoming overtly 
apparent only over time with further progression of decline. This possibility can only be 
examined with longitudinal data. 
On a related note, the clinical utility of the depletion effect cannot be determined 
based on a nonclinical sample and the potential impact of depletion in cognitively 
compromised individuals should be examined in future studies. To the extent that level of 
depletion is an indicator of the resilience of the neurocognitive systems supporting EF, 
then declining or dementing adults might be particularly vulnerable to this type of 
interference. In other words, level of depletion may be diagnostic and/or prognostic. 
Alternatively, regardless of cognitive trajectory, depletion may be an indicator of 
functional cognitive integrity under changing circumstances in daily life. On the other 
hand, depletion may only be detectable in healthy populations with sufficient executive 
range to show measurable dips in their full capacity (Franchow & Suchy, 2015). Future 
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research with clinical samples will be necessary to examine these possibilities. 
 
Limitations of the Current Study 
 
 The current study has several potential limitations. First, though it was our 
intention to examine depletion in a cognitively and neurologically healthy sample, the 
applicability of these results to the general population may therefore be limited. The 
current sample is more highly educated than the general US population (Ewert & 
Kominski, 2014), and is therefore likely to be unusually high functioning in comparison 
to the general population of older adults. Most of the sample completed at least some 
college, and the average educational attainment was the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree 
(16 years). Not only is our sample likely to have higher cognitive reserve than the general 
population, but many were taking university courses designed for older learners at the 
time of study participation. In addition to being somewhat more educated than the general 
public, our sample was particularly homogeneous demographically; the majority of our 
participants identified as Caucasian and female. It is certainly possible that differences in 
depletion exist based on ethnic, cultural, socioeconomic, and religious differences not 
included or measured in this sample. Future studies should examine depletion in larger, 
more demographically representative samples of older adults. 
Second, the conclusions that we can draw about the range of regulatory activity 
that is potentially depleting in older adults are limited based on these data. Though 
participants directly violating task instructions were removed from analyses (expressive 
suppression in the control group and lack of regulatory effort in the experimental group), 
both groups reported uninstructed and overlapping additional methods of affect 
regulation. While the current study included a control group (instructed not to regulate 
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their affect), we did not include an alternate regulatory condition; for example, a group 
instructed to positively reappraise or to redirect their attention from upsetting parts of the 
videos. Training trials in which participants are instructed in a specific strategy and 
afforded opportunity to practice would also facilitate isolation of “pure” strategies. The 
purpose of the current study was to examine executive disruption rather than to capture 
the impact of the full spectrum of emotion regulation per se, and we chose suppression 
because of its demonstrated detrimental effect on executive performance in younger 
adults.  Additional studies are needed to determine the range of regulatory activities with 
a negative impact on EF in later life.  
 Third, the model of depletion suggested by these results may be somewhat limited 
in its application to everyday life due to the restricted range of emotional responses 
regulated. Disgusting stimuli are commonly used in experimental manipulations requiring 
regulation of negative affect, as disgust is associated with reliably high autonomic 
response as well as consistent subjective unpleasant emotional experience (Gross, 1998). 
Amusing stimuli were also included to induce positively valenced affect of similar 
intensity to disgust (Hubert, Moller, & de Jong-Meyer, 1993). However, disgust and 
amusement clearly represent a small proportion of emotional experience in daily life. To 
determine whether regulation of less intense negative and positive affect is similarly-
depleting in older adulthood, future studies may wish to examine regulation of sadness, 
irritation, curiosity, joviality, etc. 
 Fourth, though executive depletion is statistically significant in the current study, 
the effect size is quite small. The difference of 1.36 executive composite scaled score 
points gained in the control group versus .8 executive composite scaled score points 
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gained in the experimental group is not enough to amount to a practical or even 
detectable difference in cognitive assessments. A number of factors that might have 
contributed to this modest effect have been discussed above, including an unusually well-
educated sample and some overlap in regulatory approach between the control and 
experimental groups. Effect size might also be improved in the absence of within-session 
practice effects. Future studies may wish to obtain baseline performances on a different 
day or to match control and experimental groups on level of education or global cognitive 
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